On structure. The source run records more than one leg on this name that day. Any single-leg return quoted below is that leg's move, not the net result of the whole position — offsetting legs change the outcome.
Nine weeks after this print, the trader on the short side was carrying an $8.5 million mark-to-market loss on a position whose best possible outcome was $6.4 million. It still finished as a complete winner. Both halves of that sentence are the story, and most flow write-ups only tell you the second one.
On February 4, 2026, with Snowflake (SNOW) at $165.29, our Unusual Options Activity scanner flagged a sale of July-2026 140-strike puts at $12.50 — $6.4 million collected across 5,120 contracts on a premium-derived basis.
A sold put is a bullish position. The seller is paid up front and takes on the obligation to buy SNOW at $140 if the stock is below that on July 17. If it isn't, they keep every cent of the $6.4M — and nothing more. That cap matters here more than usual.
First published: Daily Institutional Flow Digest, February 4, 2026 · SNOW flow on 2026-02-04.
The print itself
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-02-04 |
| Symbol | SNOW |
| Side | SELL |
| Type | PUT |
| Strike | 140 |
| Expiration | 2026-07-17 |
| Premium collected | $6.4M |
| Contracts (premium-derived) | 5,120 |
| Entry option price | $12.50 |
| Spot price at trade | $165.29 |
| Source-feed strategy tag | "Short Put" |
| Open/close signal | OPEN |
Two structural details set the shape of everything that followed.
The cushion was 15.3%. At a $165.29 spot, the 140 strike sat $25.29 below the money. The seller was being paid $12.50 to absorb a drop of that size — a reasonable-looking distance, and, as it turned out, not nearly enough.
The clock was 163 days. February 4 to July 17 is a little over five months. That is short enough that the position had a real resolution date, and long enough for a lot to go wrong in between. If the seller posted full cash collateral against the obligation — 5,120 contracts at $140 is $71.68 million — the $6.4M credit works out to 8.9% over 163 days, roughly 20% annualized. That is the trade's whole upside, fixed on day one.
What happened next
SNOW did not cooperate. Not at first.
| Date | SNOW close | 140P close | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-04 (print) | $165.29 | $12.50 | collected $6.4M |
| 2026-04-10 (option peak) | $121.11 | $29.14 | −$8.52M mark-to-market |
| 2026-05-28 (gap higher) | $239.20 | $0.21 | credit essentially secured |
| 2026-07-16 (last mark) | $270.02 | $0.18 | ~98.6% of credit captured |
| 2026-07-17 (expiry) | $268.90 | — | finished $128.90 above the strike |
The first two months were a chop — SNOW ran to $182.58 by February 10 and the put decayed to $9.00, then gave it back on the February 23 slide to $157.60. Nothing alarming.
April was alarming. SNOW closed at $149.99 on April 8, $132.24 on April 9, and $121.11 on April 10 — 26.7% below the print, and $18.89 inside the strike the seller had written. The put, sold for $12.50, marked at $29.14.
On a sold leg, a rising option price is a loss. That $29.14 peak is not a gain to celebrate; it is the seller's worst moment. At 5,120 contracts it represents an unrealized loss of $8,519,680 — 1.33× the entire credit collected. Anyone reading that chart line as a 133% winner has the sign backwards, which is exactly the error that makes short-premium flow so easy to misreport.
Then it reversed. SNOW recovered through late April and May, and on May 28 gapped from $175.26 to $239.20 — a 36.5% single-session move that took the put from $5.15 to $0.21 and effectively ended the contest. The last observed mark, on July 16, was $0.18 — the option had lost 98.6% of its value, which on this side of the trade means the seller had banked ~98.6% of the $6.4M, leaving about $92,160 of residual liability.
At the July 17 expiry SNOW closed at $268.90, $128.90 above the strike. The stock is $329.11 as of August 27 — 99% above where the put was written.
Peak versus finish, and why they point opposite ways
We show both numbers on every flashback, because a write-up that stops at the favourable one is marketing. On a bought call the peak is the high-water mark and the finish is usually a giveback. Here it inverts: the option's peak ($29.14, April 10) was the seller's deepest hole, and the finish ($0.18, July 16) was close to the maximum available profit. The giveback ran the other way — the market gave back an $8.5M paper loss over the following fourteen weeks.
That asymmetry is the honest lesson. This position's best case was $6.4M and its worst case, if SNOW had gone to zero, was $71.68M less the credit. In April it was down more than its own maximum profit. A seller with tighter risk limits, a margin call, or a shorter fuse closes that position at $121.11 and books a real loss — and the July outcome never happens to them. The trade worked because someone sat through it, not because the entry was clever.
Being straight about the denominator
Across the eligible prints we score — opening trades with a claimable direction, aged past our 60-day publishing embargo — roughly half work. SNOW is in the good half, and it is a particularly instructive member of it precisely because it spent nine weeks looking like it belonged in the other one.
To be explicit about what we did and did not do: we did not predict SNOW's recovery, and we make no claim to have. We flagged an unusual print on the morning it hit the tape — a large, opening, one-sided sale on a line that was not normally traded that way. Someone with far more information than a scanner has took a view. We published the print; they took the risk.
Two things this trade teaches
A sold put is bullish, and its chart runs upside down. If you are reading options flow and cannot tell which side initiated, you cannot tell the direction. The same $6.4M on the 140 line, bought instead of sold, would have been a bearish position that peaked at +133% in April and expired worthless in July — the exact mirror of what happened. Volume alone will never tell you which one you are looking at.
Capped reward means uncapped patience is part of the position. The seller's upside stopped at the credit; their drawdown did not. That combination only pays if the holder can survive the middle. When you see institutional short-put flow, the interesting question is rarely "will it work" — it is "who can hold it if it doesn't, right away."
See the flow as it prints
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